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EVOLUTIONARY POSSIBILITIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
AND ATAVISTIC NATIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 




Chapman University, California, USA 




Abstract: The question of how rising atavistic nationalism will affect democracies worldwide is an essential 
one of our time. In this paper, I focus instead on conducting a comparative historical analysis of atavistic 
nationalism in two unrecognized states: North Cyprus and Taiwan. I argue that the democratic crisis of our 
times is, in its essence, economic and has been precipitated by the failure of democracies to build 
domestic capacities to support democratic values. Furthermore, I posit that engaging populaces at the 
local political level will prove essential to preserving democracies around the world. I conclude by 
underlining that atavistic nationalism is indeed a significant threat to regional and global peace and 
requires further co-operation on trade and governance, and should be engaged at the local level. Lastly, I 
suggest that co-creating local cultures that will act to soften atavistic nationalism, which feeds off the 
perception of threats and fear.  
 
Keywords: Unrecognized States; Democratization; Atavistic Nationalism; Economic Crises; Narrative 
Positioning; Taiwan; North Cyprus 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 6, No. 3, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 




Atavistic nationalism refers to the new and widespread model of the extremist 
ideology that promotes exclusive political identities based on the group‘s everlasting, 
nobler nature as a ‗truth of history,‘ about an ‗imagined reality‘. Nationalist ideologies 
are making a strong comeback around the globe, whereas democracy as a form of 
governance is simultaneously on a worldwide decline (The Economist 2018; Freedom 
House 2017). In fact, in conjunction with a rise in the popularity of right-wing ideologies, 
de-democratization has occurred in advanced democracies (The Economist 2018). This 
defies the theoretical assumption that consolidated democracies will not retreat. 
However, as consolidated democracies de-democratize, both scholars and policymakers 
must further their understanding of the dynamics of democracy in an age of atavistic 
nationalism. 
This paper aims to capture the complex long-term dynamics of nationalism and 
to inform scholars and policymakers on how to positively engage pushes for unity in a 
pluralistic society. Nationalism, however, is a narrative process that develops over an 
extended time – requiring a longitudinal and historical study – whereas it is a relatively 
recent occurrence within advanced democracies. Therefore, scholars need to identify 
and study cases where atavistic nationalism has been active for decades to produce a 
comprehensive study. For this purpose, I study the evolutions of North Cyprus and 
Taiwan through a comparative historical analysis. Thereafter, I argue that the democratic 
crisis of our times is, in its essence, economic and has been precipitated by the failure of 
democracies to build domestic, democratic capacities. I conclude by underlining that 
atavistic nationalism is a significant threat to regional and global peace and offer 




Defining Atavistic Nationalism 
 
Nationalism is generally defined as a political tendency to prioritize an exclusive 
group in the use of the political resources of a state (Verkhovskii and Pain 2012, 52).  
However, the nature of nationalism, i.e. whether it is a destructive or constructive 
political force, has long been debated. Mishra underlines the rise of nationalism in the 
USA as a moment that can function as the crisis needed to jumpstart American 
democracy (Mishra 2017). Some other scholars who study the democratic transitions of 
ex-colonial states underline that the transition process was facilitated by a rising sense 
of nationalism (Brudny and Finkel 2011; Sabatovych 2017; Surzhko-Harned 2010). 
Nevertheless, most scholars instead argue that nationalism is a threat to peace at all 
levels – domestic, regional, and global (Bonikowski 2016; Conversi 2012; GrigorSuny 
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2017). The literature also underlines that a nation can be defined in one of two ways: 
civically or ethnocentrically. On the one hand, civic nationalism, where all citizens are 
afforded the same rights and privileges, can promote loyalty to the state and its 
democracy. This evolving nationalism espouses the democratic values of liberty, 
equality, and sovereignty, thus paving the way to a deep democracy (Sabatovych 2017, 
1); (Fukuyama 1992). On the other hand, ethnocentric nationalism instead aims to not 
only achieve cultural homogeneity but also render state power exclusive (Dyrstad 2012, 
818). This is antithetical to democracy. 
Mostly, nationalism relies upon existing inter-group boundaries based on 
ethnicity and religion to promote cultural homogeneity, despite inherent societal 
heterogeneity (Sabatovych 2017, 4). Elites then attempt to utilize this sense of unity to 
create a self-sustaining system of legitimacy and thus win re-elections (Conversi 2012, 
789). It is important to note that whether nationalism promotes democracy is therefore 
based on the will of the political elite, moderated by the extent of political mobilizations 
at the social level as well as the extent of societal cleavages (Sabatovych 2017, 18). 
Therefore, nationalism should not be treated simply as a malady. 
Atavistic nationalism is a special type of ethnocentric and classist nationalism. 
Much as with other nationalist movements, atavistic nationalism is driven by an ‗Us vs. 
Other‘ mentality (Gingrich 2006; Volkan 1998). What makes the current atavistic 
nationalism distinct are three factors (modified from Gingrich‘s typology (Gingrich 2006, 
199–200)): tripartite hierarchy (elites-us-immigrants or multinational organizations-us-
immigrants); fear-driven: fear of losing (globalization; capitalism) and fear of 
invasion/being taken advantage of (integrationist policies, terrorism, or neo-
colonization); hope driven: spurred on by a mythical past and/or future of prosperity 
and security. 
 
The Unrecognized States and Atavistic Nationalism 
 
The unrecognized states have only recently come to be studied. Nevertheless, 
there is an agreement that these entities feature the following characteristics: a) a 
violent, unilateral secession from a parent state, whose de jure territories this new entity 
claims and controls de facto; b) independently existing for more than four years, running 
state institutions; c) lack of recognition by a majority of the international community 
(non-recognition); d) exhibiting high internal legitimacy and low external legitimacy; and 
lastly e) they are not completely dependent on any other state for policy-making and 
domestic affairs. 
The relationship between atavistic nationalism and unrecognized states is 
significant: unrecognized states are born of and driven by incompatible forms of 
atavistic nationalism (Mulaj 2011, 43). Therefore, studying unrecognized states is critical 
for scholars to explain the dynamics of atavistic nationalism, as well as how and why it 
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can pave the way for either de-democratization or democratization. While atavistic 
nationalism threatens human rights and democracy, the existing global and local 
institutions have yet to put forth a coherent agenda to address this threat. Therefore, 
the scholarly community needs to explore this phenomenon by studying critical cases, 
such as unrecognized states. 
 




The Turkish Cypriot people are one of the two official communities inhabiting the 
island of Cyprus and a founding partner of the Republic of Cyprus. Due to a Greek 
military coup d‘état on the island in 1974, which turned violent, the Turkish military 
intervened through the ‗Happy Peace Operation‘ – what many perceive as an invasion – 
dividing the island physically into two. Negotiations to reunite the island went fruitless 
for nine years and the Turkish Cypriot community, through the will of its political leader 
– Rauf Denktash – and his Turkish military backing, unilaterally declared independence. 
They established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC or NC) in 1983. 
Denktash was a political figure who established himself as the symbol of Turkish 
Cypriot independence and created a network of patronage around his hero image, thus 
monopolizing political power (Isachenko 2012, 44–45). From its establishment until 
2000, NC was ruled by corruption and a patronage network built on the distribution of 
plundered resources (leftover from the displaced Greek Cypriots) and the aid from 
Turkey (Duzgun 2000, 29), which created a two-layered dependence economy. However, 
this network was kept somewhat in check by the Turkish Cypriot history of democratic 
governance and the democratic infrastructure inherited from the Republic of Cyprus. 
Therefore, the political system of NC was stably semi-democratic, but featured an over-
powered executive supported by the independent armed forces of another state. 
This system self-legitimized in an atavistic fashion: that the Turkish Cypriots were 
simply Turks and that they had to be grateful to Turkey for being saved. Furthermore, by 
tying the Turkish Cypriots to Turkey so closely, Denktash would help the community 
returns to its ‗prosperous times‘ of the Ottoman era on the island. Additionally, the only 
guarantee for Turkish Cypriot security and prosperity was through the reinforcement of 
the Turkish Cypriot ties with Turkey. Turkey was the ‗Motherland‘ that would feed and 
develop NC. During this era, those who sought to argue for peacemaking with the Greek 
Cypriots or those who defined themselves as Cypriots (rather than Turks or Turkish 
Cypriots) were labeled as traitors (Duzgun 2000, 20), with Denktash claiming that only 
the donkeys of Cyprus were Cypriot (Isachenko 2012, 65, 69). This atavistic identity was 
disbursed through state-controlled media and schools, as well as symbols such as flags 
(Navaro-Yashin 2012, 18; 2006); however, it alienated a majority of the island‘s 
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population due to its refusal of a Cypriot culture or identity (Duzgun 2000, 69; Isachenko 
2012, 47). This was a well-established atavistic system: a hierarchy of the world-a Turkic 
us-the ‗traitors‘; driven by a fear of losing political independence, plundered gains, and 
of a return to communal strife; and driven by the hope of remaining independent and 
prospering through the aid of the ‗Motherland‘ (Duzgun 2000, 77). Additionally, the 
Turkish Cypriot politics and institutions self-organized under the effect of atavistic 
nationalism in such a way as to allow Denktash and the nationalists to monopolize 
political power perpetually. Up to today, the nationalists hold circa 50% of the popular 
vote despite widespread and documented corruption and ineffective governance. 
The rise of atavistic nationalism in Turkish Cypriot politics was facilitated by 
Denktash‘s self-promoted war hero image and the support of the armed forces that 
reported to – as they still do – Turkey. Ultimately, this process allowed for an individual 
to establish a virtual throne that went uncontested despite widespread nepotism, 
corruption, and authoritarian behavior including the suppression of the civil society and 
the media (Duzgun 2000, 296; Isachenko 2012, 109). Such a process supports the ethno-
symbolic conceptualization of nationalism where the notion of the ‗nation‘ is created, 
reinforced, and perpetuated using symbolism (‗Motherland‘, war hero, etc.), melded with 
both an imaginary ideal (the Ottoman times) and an ‗imminent‘ threat (forceful 
reintegration and oppression). Furthermore, this also supports the assertion that 
nationalism is less about loyalty to a flag or a group that existed primordially and 
instead more about where a person might find economic prosperity and security 
(Isachenko 2012). 
The essential question, then, is as such: how did the prominence of atavistic 
nationalism help shape the evolution of the Turkish Cypriot political system? It was not 
until huge economic crises that undermined both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
economies in 2000 and 2002, which decreased their ability to use day-saving economic 
aid and plunder to band-aid the festering wound that was a mishandled and 
unproductive economic policy, that significant opposition was able to rise (Loizides 
2015, 181). Furthermore, these crises coincided with the Annan Plan negotiations in 
Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots had the illusory hope of being reintegrated with the 
international community both economically and socially by reintegrating with the 
Republic of Cyprus and becoming members of the EU. The popular perception went that 
if the Turkish Cypriot community accepted a reintegration as proposed, they would 
receive economic and social benefits even if the plan failed. Furthermore, they held the 
chance of full EU membership should they reintegrate (Loizides 2015, 181). As such, the 
opportunity – mainly economic – posed by reintegration exceeded the nationalist 
rhetoric‘s ability to threaten or provide hope. Therefore, a considerable opposition 
gathered, and the non-nationalist parties capitalized on this momentum, displacing 
Denktash (Isachenko 2012, 146). Eventually, the Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly 
to affirm the Annan Plan in a communal referendum. 
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However, after the Republic of Cyprus rejected the Plan and entered the EU as a 
full member, the Turkish Cypriots‘ lot did not improve. Indeed, increased 
democratization and Europeanization did not generate either recognition or prosperity, 
which undermined the newly-generated trust in the international community, the 
reformist elites, and the local and international CSOs (Isachenko 2012, 112). Ultimately, 
this undermined the new narrative of prosperity through democratization and 
Europeanization, allowing for a nationalist resurgence, whereby the status quo ante – i.e. 
nepotism, corruption, repression, executive overreach – re-emerged. Meanwhile, due to 
the schism with the Turkic atavism and the efforts of the opposition in asserting a 
distinctly Cypriot identity, a new atavistic narrative against Turkish immigrants was 
created. Due to this new atavism, the immigrants to NC are discriminated against and 
not integrated, and there is political polarization which has stopped the democratic 
gears in the NC. 
Overall, atavistic nationalism emerged as the result of the ruling elites‘ ability to 
create a self-perpetuating, vote-earning system: firstly, they controlled natural resources 
and international aid, thus creating patronage networks to either bind or co-opt or 
subvert critical opposition elites; secondly, they effectively utilized symbolism, fear, and 
hope – as well as the media and educational facilities that they controlled – to promote 
nationalist voting blocs among the populace. Furthermore, while the former dynamic is 
de facto nepotism and corruption, which normally causes loss of votes and thus political 
power, the latter dynamic allowed for such actions to be tolerated, as war heroes 
deserved exceptional treatment. As such, the nationalists that held power during the 
violent era of the Cypriot Conflict extended their power into a new, more pluralistic era. 
This only changed when the patron-client system ran out of resources while the ‗fear‘ of 
unsustainable economics and the ‗hope‘ of better trading opportunities displaced the 
nationalist narrative. Nevertheless, the system and institutions built around atavistic 
nationalism allowed for the easy re-emergence of the nationalist wing at the first failure 
of the alternative elites, demonstrating the persistence of the nationalist wing whence in 
power. Moreover, counter-atavism is just as destructive: it is discriminatory against 
identified ‗others‘ and has further polarized the Turkish Cypriot community. 
 
Taiwan (Republic of China) 
 
Taiwan – officially named the Republic of China (ROC) – is an unrecognized state 
situated in the South China Sea. It seceded from the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1945, although both the ROC and the PRC officially claim to represent all of China – and 
the latter threaten military measures in case the former officially declares independence, 
defying the One China Policy (Chu 1996, 80). Both its non-recognition and the evolution 
of its nationalism are unique, which render Taiwan a critical case within this study. 
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Taiwan – made up of three islands in the South China Sea – was under the 
colonial control of the Japanese until 1943, where its administration was taken over by 
China, which had an ancestral claim to the islands. However, not only did the Mainlander 
Chinese discriminate against the ‗Japan-ified‘ Taiwanese, but they also ruled the island 
with iron fists. This created a Mainlander vs. Native divide that was an unbridgeable 
chasm until 1979. The Taiwanese were excluded from higher government positions and 
the Kuomintang (KMT – the Chinese political party in a single-party system) appointed 
its members to the legislature for lifelong terms. Furthermore, the fist of the KMT got 
heavier as the power-holders of the Mainland lost their Civil War against the Communist 
Party of China and had to retreat to Taiwan. The KMT was paranoid regarding the 
spread of ‗the communist disease‘. They, therefore, enacted complete repression as well 
as Martial Law, which led to many casualties and arbitrary arrests through a military 
response to widespread protests in Taiwan. For decades, the KMT ran roughshod 
whereas the natives took their politics – and their resistance –underground, waiting for 
an opportune moment while building their capacity (Chu 1996; Gold 1986, 52). 
Until the mid-70s, due to the effects of the Cold War, whereby Taiwan posed as a 
crucial ally against Chinese Communism, the West not only recognized the ROC as the 
sovereign of all of China, but they also did not scrutinize domestic Taiwanese affairs. 
This allowed for widespread human rights abuses, authoritarianism, and repression (Chu 
1996, 76). However, as the communist threat faded, so did the stock of the KMT. The 
ROC started to rapidly lose recognition and its sponsor, the USA, debated aid to Taiwan 
on the grounds of the KMT‘s human rights violations. This created the political space for 
the underground Taiwanese network to emerge into power openly (Phillips 2016, 672).  
While the military power was still held by the Mainlanders, which disallowed 
violent means of revolution, the state‘s repressive capacity had declined due to the 
removal of Western support (Chou and Nathan 1987; Phillips 2016, 668). Furthermore, 
the oppressed Taiwanese majority had gained economic might external to the 
government and was well-organized. As such, when widespread protests in Kaohsiung 
were met with repression in late 1979, the detractors went even further and the KMT 
realized that its iron fist policies were not sustainable. This held especially true as Chiang 
Kai-Shek, the founder around whom the Mainlander patronage networks revolved, had 
passed away. Therefore, the new KMT leadership was willing to compromise. Successive 
democratic reforms followed, including the lifting of the Martial Law in 1986, allowing 
for the formation of a second party, the holding of popular elections in 1996, and the 
first peaceful transfer of power in 2000.   
There were two attempts at utilizing atavistic nationalism in the case of Taiwan; 
one was both ineffective and negative, whereas the other was the exact opposite. To 
begin with, the Chinese Mainlanders saw themselves as above the natives. As such, they 
positioned themselves against the PRC as well as the native majority. Furthermore, this 
narrative ignored the fears of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis re-colonization and repression 
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(based on their experience with the Japanese). Instead, the narrative focused on 
promoting threat perceptions regarding China and the communist disease, while also 
giving hope that the ROC would experience a future resurgence and regain control of all 
of China. Further facilitated by the founder‘s establishment of a patronage network that 
was almost completely exclusive to the Mainlanders, this nationalist narrative succeeded 
in promoting a distinctly Chinese identity in the Mainlanders, which excluded the 
Taiwanese. Not surprisingly, this type of atavistic nationalism, where a minority not only 
distinguishes itself from but also aims to suppress the majority, failed once the latter 
gained power. Instead, this attempt at nationalism caused the creation of a Taiwanese 
national narrative. 
Indeed, the Taiwanese did not develop a distinct sense of self as a nation until 
after their experiences with the KMT. When they did, as instrumentalized by opposition 
politicians, they positioned themselves against both the PRC and the KMT (Chu, 
Diamond, and Templeman 2016, 13). Fearing a return to Mainlander dictatorship or the 
loss of popular political power, the Taiwanese instead pursued and succeeded in 
democratization (Phillips 2016). Furthermore, this narrative included hopes: of the 
Taiwanese for gaining political power; of avoiding reintegration with China; and of 
pushing for recognition. Meanwhile, due to the lingering Mainlander influence in 
politics, Chinese threats (requiring the incorporation of Chinese concerns into the body 
politique), and the fact that the Taiwanese were divided within (there are three native 
groups) allowed for the emergence of a civic type of atavistic identity (Phillips 2016). 
Currently, this narrative is suffering from polarization, however, vis-à-vis how to deal 
with China: whether the Taiwanese should push for independence or create cooperative 
ties with the economic giant next door (Diamond 2001; Zuo 2016). Nevertheless, the 
intra-group differences and the power balance among the groups, coupled with the lack 
of the myth of a primordial Taiwanese nation, will likely ensure that the narrative 
remains civic.  
 
Analysis: Two Evolutionary Paths of Atavistic Nationalism 
 
Both cases explored in this article differ greatly regarding their geographical 
position, demographic outlook, and economic performance. Aside from not being 
landlocked – which is an important variable regarding state-building dynamics – the two 
other common points among them were non-recognition and the use of atavistic 
nationalism for nation-building. Nevertheless, the cases of atavistic nationalism in North 
Cyprus and Taiwan demonstrated both significant similarities and significant differences, 
which are analytically important for understanding the evolution of similar narratives 
arising in the Western democracies and Asia – among others. The findings of the 
present study validate the model of atavistic nationalism that was adopted herein. 
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Firstly, the movements towards creating an atavistic nationalist identity covered 
in these cases – regardless of whether they resulted in an ethnic or civic interpretation – 
thrived on a tripartite where the ‗us‘ was threatened by not only more powerful, external 
‗others‘ but also less powerful, internal ‗others‘. The former ranged from parent states to 
the international community at large, whereas the latter ranged from immigrant 
populations to domestic ‗traitors‘. This positioning allowed for the assumption of 
victimhood and potential threat narratives. 
Secondly, the movements towards atavism utilized both fear-based and hope-
based rhetoric – pointing out real, perceived, or even hypothetical (faith-based) 
possibilities – to underline the importance of ethnic nationalism. On the one hand, the 
threats served the functions of not only isolating the targeted community from the 
identified others but also for having an easy target to scapegoat, such as the 
disempowered immigrant populations, for the community‘s woes. On the other hand, 
the elusive hope functioned to justify the measures taken by the nationalists to get to 
the desired future by any means possible and to help the community endure hardships 
‗for a better tomorrow‘. However, while the similarities suggested by the model were 
indeed observed, there were further findings that fell outside the scope of the model: 
patronage networks. 
Indeed, the analyzed attempts at defining nationalism in an atavistic fashion 
revolved around a ‗heroic‘ figure – the prototype (Volkan 1998) – and the patron-client 
relationships built around his patronage. These figures espoused a stance of strength 
and came from the traditionally-powerful class and gender: a well-educated, Turkic 
Cypriot male; and a Mainlander male leader with political and military backgrounds. 
Furthermore, they centralized the control of the state‘s economic resources which they 
used to ‗cement‘ alliances and to co-opt ‗moderate‘ opposition. This high level of 
bought support, coupled with their unimpeachable ‗heroism‘, made them untouchable 
and rendered their opposition immoral by default, which facilitated the nationalist 
narrative.  
Furthermore, in both cases, state-controlled institutions played a critical role. 
Indeed, in both North Cyprus and Taiwan, the government used media and education to 
disseminate the idea that the ‗us‘ was inherently Turkic or Chinese/Taiwanese, 
respectively. Moreover, in Taiwan, the official state language and the educational 
language both were adjusted to be Chinese to promote Sino nationalism, whereas the 
same was done to promote nativist nationalism. Therefore, it appears that atavistic 
nationalism requires the support of a powerful league of political elites‘ promotion, as 
well as the use of state-controlled institutions, to take hold. Then, what do the 
differences among the cases reveal?  
First and foremost, ‗cultural homogeneity‘ – real or perceived – matters. Indeed, 
atavistic nationalism was an easier sell within communities that had more inherent unity 
– such as the Turkish Cypriots, Mainlanders, or the Native Taiwanese.  
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Secondly, international scrutiny and international economic ties also matter. In 
the case of North Cyprus, Turkish support for or against the nationalist narrative proved 
vital. Meanwhile, vis-à-vis Taiwan, the support of the USA and the West, who acted as 
both sponsors and trade partners of the regime, were critical in determining whether 
Chinese nationalism stayed or whether Taiwanese nationalism arose due to their role as 
human rights watchdogs.  
Thirdly, the intra-‗us‘-group divisions, their extent, and their nature matter 
greatly. The Northern Cypriots were divided along political lines vis-à-vis a potential 
resolution to the Cypriot Conflict, which was ethnicized as the fate of the Turkish 
immigrants and the future demographics of a united Cyprus were at stake. As such, the 
Turkish Cypriot community was further divided along pro-reintegration/Cypriotic and 
pro-status quo/Turkic lines. Such a polarization on incompatible grounds has long 
caused a decline of Turkish Cypriot democracy, where the essential public debate has 
been lost to the fear of Turkification or reintegration. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, the Chinese 
identity waned, as a group that was born and raised in the islands rather than the 
Mainland emerged and as external support to the KMT regime was pulled. Contrarily, 
the majoritarian, nativist nationalism took hold; however, as the majority was divided 
into three and the anti-China/pro-independence sentiment did not necessarily take 
deep roots, the ‗us‘ was divided along ‗policy‘ lines. Therefore, unlike the Northern 
Cypriot case, while the community was polarized to an extent, the nationalism aligned 
with civic principles. This was also aided by extensive trade relations with democratic 
partners.  
 
CONCLUSION: ATAVISTIC NATIONALISM AND POLICY CHOICES 
 
According to the present study, atavistic nationalism appears to arise only when 
there is a vacuum created by a systemic shock – be it diplomatic, militaristic, or 
economic – which has created a sense of threat and hopelessness among the populace 
at large. In the West and Asia, the economic crisis of 2008 and then of 2020 has 
precipitated this systemic shock. Indeed, as the globe experienced economic decline and 
thus relative deprivation, the promises of security and prosperity upon which 
multicultural democracy is based were perceived to have failed. Welfare chauvinism, 
coupled with skepticism regarding multiculturalism, meant that a new, more exclusive 
definition of ‗us‘ became necessary ‗to protect the community from the 
moochers/immigrants and the sell-out ideologues‘. Facilitated by the post-9/11 global 
conjecture and inherent racism, the atavistic nationalism that we observe today was 
born from economic woes – real or perceived. Predatorial elites can capitalize on this 
opportunity of a need for atavism by stoking fears and promising illusive hope – 
especially if these elites are symbolic of traditional power-holders that are not 
‗traditional elites‘; most likely male and of a prominent background.  
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Furthermore, if there are deep ideological, intragroup cleavages, there appears a 
higher likelihood that atavistic nationalism will not be widely adopted – such as in the 
case of Taiwan. However, if ethno-ideological divisions are persistent in the community, 
where the groups are relatively balanced in power, dysfunctional hyper-polarization 
along competing nationalist lines appears to become more probable, as in the case of 
NC. Lastly, in the case of elevated levels of intragroup homogeneity, atavistic 
nationalism seems to more easily take hold. Importantly, should atavistic nationalism 
become systemic, benefit networks, educational facilities, and media revolving around 
perpetuating the prominence of this narrative will be enacted and will have lasting 
effects. 
The success of Taiwan in breaking away from destructive atavism – as well as the 
temporary success that Turkish Cypriots likewise saw in the early 2000s – can be 
attributed to extensive, positive engagement with the international community. Indeed, 
the more these states traded and/or entered a cooperation with democratic partners, 
the less they were likely to pursue unitary identities – especially when the economy 
thrived under plurality. As such, the international community should seek to reinforce 
interdependence – i.e. ties of economic and political cooperation – especially with those 
countries that appear susceptible to atavistic narratives. 
Atavistic nationalism poses a threat to the political systems that we have come to 
take for granted – if the scholars and policymakers choose to ignore, isolate, or not 
engage with this type of narrative. However, such narratives do not necessarily lead to 
authoritarianism. While further cases must be explored to explain the systemic 
underpinnings of atavistic nationalism, the cases outlined in this article have shown two 
evolutionary possibilities of atavism. It will be up to the international community to 
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